In 
Introduction
We consider the case in which an automated enterprise has an electronic supply chain consisting of various artificial agents. In particular, we view such a virtual enterprise as a MAS (multi-agent system). Our example, for this study, of supply chain management is the MIT Beer Game [9] , which has attracted much attention from both the supply chain management practitioners as well as academic researchers. There are four types of agents in this chain, sequentially arranged: Retailer, Wholesaler, Distributor, and Manufacturer. In the MIT Beer Game, as played with human subjects, each self-interested agent tries to achieve its own goal of minimizing its inventory costs in making orders to its supplier. Each agent makes its own prediction of future demand of its customer based on its own observations. We distinguish two versions of the Beer Game in the literature by labeling them as the "MIT Beer Game" and the "Columbia Beer Game" [1] or "Stationary Beer Game" [1] . The latter is a modified version of the former. These two versions differ in whether the system is stationary or non-stationary; whether demand is deterministic or stochastic; whether information delay is fixed for all players or varies among players or even stochastic; whether all players incur penalty costs or only the Retailer incurs such a cost; whether all players incur the same holding cost or the downstream player should incur higher holding cost; and whether the players know the demand distribution. Table 1 summarizes the major differences between these two versions of the Beer Game. In this paper, we focus on the MIT Beer Game first and then extend our results to the Columbia Beer Game.
The observed performance of human beings managing supply chains, whether in field or laboratory settings, is usually far from optimal from a system-wide point of view [4, 9] . This may be due to lack of incentives for information sharing, bounded rationality, or possibly the consequent of individually rational behavior that works against the interests of the group. It would thus be interesting to see if we can gain insights into the operations and dynamics of such supply chains, by using artificial agents instead of humans. This paper makes a contribution in this direction. We differ from current research on supply chains in the OM/OR area, in that the approach taken here is an agent-based, information-processing model, in an automated marketplace. While in the OM/OR literature, the focus is usually on finding optimal solutions assuming fixed environment: such as fixed linear supply chain structure, known demand distribution to all players and fixed lead time in information delay as well physical delay, it is generally very difficult to derive and to generalize such optimal policies when the environment changes.
We have organized the paper as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 describes our methodology and implementation of the Beer Game using artificial agents approach. Section 4 reports results from our various agent-based experiments on the 0-7695-0981-9/01 $10.00 (c) 2001 IEEE 1
